



The Limits of a Narrow Legislative Override
INTRODUCTION
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court held that an
employee was barred from suing her employer for pay discrimination under
Title VII. The plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter, was a twenty-year employee of
Goodyear who, over the course of her employment, repeatedly received lower
raises than her male counterparts because supervisors had given her negative
evaluations due to her sex.2 By the end of her employment at Goodyear,
Ledbetter's salary was significantly lower than those of any of her male peers.'
The Supreme Court, however, held that Ledbetter could not recover because
she failed to comply with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) charge provision, which requires that plaintiffs file claims of
employment discrimination with the EEOC within 18o days of the
discriminatory act before they may sue under Title VII.4 The Court held that
only the initial pay-setting decisions themselves constituted discrete acts of
discrimination; subsequent paychecks were merely "adverse effects" lacking the
intent required to establish disparate treatment.'
1. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
2. Id. at 2165-66.
3. Id. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Ledbetter was paid $3,727 per month; the lowest paid
male area manager received $4,286 per month, the highest paid, $5,236." (citing Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005); Brief for the Petitioner at
4, Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 2610990)).
4. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2172; see also 42 U.S.C. S 20ooe-5(e)(1) (2000).
5. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 216q.
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In response, Congress is considering legislation to override the Ledbetter
decision by clarifying that under Title VII, a discrete discriminatory act occurs
each time an employee is affected by a discriminatory compensation decision.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 ("Fair Pay Act") passed the House on
July 31, 2007, and provides in part that "an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation... when an individual
is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice ., A substantively similar bill, the Fair Pay Act of 2007, has been
introduced in the Senate and is currently being considered by the Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions! While this Comment discusses
the Fair Pay Act as passed by the House, its analysis applies to both versions of
the bill, which would have similar effect.
This Comment argues that amending Title VII only with respect to pay
discrimination will hinder future plaintiffs in bringing nonwage discrimination
claims and will promote future narrowing of the doctrine interpreting Title
VII's EEOC charge provision. These consequences contravene both Congress's
purpose in enacting the override legislation and past congressional
understandings of Title VII.8 Congress should therefore expand the scope of its
legislative override to make clear that each application of a discriminatory
policy, whether or not related to compensation, constitutes an unlawful
employment practice.
The Fair Pay Act's limitations are symptomatic of a broader flaw in
congressional overrides of judicial decisions: when Congress passes legislation
focused too narrowly on the factual context of the judicial decision it is
designed to override, it may have adverse consequences. For example, future
courts may interpret a partial override to signal that Congress endorses the
holding except with regard to one specific factual context. Courts may
consequently continue to apply the holding in other factual contexts and as a
precedent for future development of the doctrine. To avoid these
consequences, Congress should better anticipate the way in which future courts
will apply a proposed legislative override to other factual contexts and future
doctrinal development.
6. H.R. 2831, iioh Cong. § 3 (as passed by House, July 31, 2007).
7. S. 1o87, itoth Cong. (2007).
8. See infra notes 27-29, 32-33 and accompanying text.
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I. THE FAIR PAY ACT'S EFFECT ON FUTURE TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS
The text of the Fair Pay Act leaves intact Ledbetter's essential holding that
"[a] new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not
commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that
entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination." 9 Future courts,
reading the Fair Pay Act to repudiate the principles of Ledbetter only with
respect to pay discrimination, likely will continue to bar relief to similarly
situated Title VII plaintiffs with non-wage-related claims. For example,
plaintiffs affected by non-wage-related intentionally discriminatory policies
will still be unable to sue under Tide VII unless they file an EEOC charge
within 18o or 300 days of the adoption of the policy.'"
Several courts have already cited Ledbetter as a bar to suits that do not
involve pay discrimination claims." For example, in a contraceptive equity case
in the Eighth Circuit, a class of plaintiffs sued AT&T under Title VII for failure
to provide contraceptive benefits to its employees. 2 The named plaintiff filed a
charge with the EEOC after being denied insurance coverage for
contraceptives, but not within three hundred days of the initial adoption of the
policy excluding contraceptive coverage from all employee health benefits
packages.' 3 Although the district court initially found for the plaintiff, when
AT&T filed a motion to reconsider summary judgment following another
9. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.
1o. If the claim is also covered by a state or local antidiscrimination law, the filing deadline is
extended to three hundred days. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-5(e)(1) (2000).
ii. Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F. 3d 1092, 1097-98, 1097 n.5 (9 th Cir. 2007) (applying Ledbetter's
reasoning to find time-barred a design-and-construction claim under the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (2000)); Walker v. Hoppe, 239 Fed. App'x 998, 999 (6th Cir. 2007)
(barring plaintiffs claim for wrongful termination because the charge period ran from the
date she was notified of her termination, not the date of the termination itself, and barring a
hostile work environment claim because plaintiff "failed to specifically identify any
intentionally discriminatory act by defendant that occurred within 300 days prior to the
filing of her EEOC charge"); Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 03-
02591, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77534, at *14-15 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007) (applying Ledbetter's
reasoning to bar female wrestlers' suit against a university for "blatantly exclud[ing] them
from the wrestling program and then fail[ing] to give them a fair opportunity to obtain a
position on the team by requiring them to compete against men, using men's rules"); Algie
v. N. Ky. Univ., No. o6-23-JGW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53347, at *13-19 (E.D. Ky. July 23,
2007) (relying on Ledbetter to bar a male employee's claim that female employees had
received promotion opportunities while he had not).
12. Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014, O15 (W.D. Mo. 20o6), vacated, No. 03-
0421-HFS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78188 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2007).
13. Id. at 1017.
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major contraceptive equity decision, 14 it also argued that plaintiffs failed to file
a timely EEOC charge under Ledbetter, which had been decided after the
district court's initial ruling.'" Even though the EEOC charge provision was
ultimately not dispositive in the case, 6 this type of case, hinging on the
application of an intentionally discriminatory policy, will continue to be
particularly vulnerable to Ledbetter's reach after the passage of the Fair Pay Act.
The Fair Pay Act's narrow language will not prevent courts from finding
these types of suits to be barred under Ledbetter. Courts likely will follow the
same pattern as they have after other narrow legislative overrides of Title VII
decisions. In 1989, the Court considered discriminatory seniority systems in
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. and held that discriminatory seniority
systems trigger the charge period only on the date of the adoption of the
system, rather than when individual employees are harmed by its application. 7
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to override that decision, clarifying that
discriminatory seniority systems constitute unlawful employment practices
both at the time of adoption and the time of application.'8 Nevertheless, lower
courts subsequently held that Lorance continued to bar as untimely Title VII
claims that an unlawful employment practice occurred at the time of a policy's
application. 9
Moreover, the Fair Pay Act could be counterproductive. Courts applying
standard modes of statutory interpretation may be more likely to apply the
Ledbetter standard to nonwage discrimination plaintiffs than if Congress had
never acted. Courts may assume that because Congress reconsidered the issue
decided in Ledbetter and did not abrogate parts of the Court's decision, it
intended to acquiesce to the Court's interpretation in the portions of the
decision that were not overridden specifically. In a number of cases, courts
have found Congress's decision to amend part of a statute without completely
overriding an existing judicial interpretation of the statute to be "evidence that
14. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3 d 936 (8th Cir. 2007).
15. Defendant AT&T Corp.'s Motion To Reconsider Summary Judgment and Class
Certification and Suggestions in Support at ii; Stocking, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78188 (No.
3 -0 4 21-HFS), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 22848.
16. The court granted summary judgment to AT&T on other grounds and mentioned in dicta
that plaintiffs disparate-impact cause of action remained viable because Ledbetter does not
reach disparate impact claims. Stocking, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78188, at *3-4.
17. 490 U.S. 9oo, 909 (1989).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2o0o)).
1g. See, e.g., Barnett v. Gonzales, No. o5- 58-IMK-JSK, 20o6 U.S. Dist LEXIS 70o85, at *11-12
(N.D. W. Va. Sept. 27, 2o6).
117:971 20o8
THE LIMITS OF A NARROW LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE
Congress affirmatively intended to preserve [the Court's interpretation]."2 A
court inclined to read Title ViI's procedural provisions narrowly might invoke
this "acquiescence rule"'" to hold that Congress's passage of the Fair Pay Act
constituted acquiescence to the general rule laid down in Ledbetter that
applications of discriminatory policy do not constitute actionable unlawful
employment practices.
While courts do not invoke acquiescence in all cases to which it may
apply," it is particularly likely that a court would give weight to Congress's
acquiescence when enacting the Fair Pay Act. The doctrine is most likely to be
invoked in cases, such as this one, where Congress was aware of a specific
issue, deliberated about it, 3 and amended the statute to override the judicial
decision only partiallyY As Jeb Barnes has shown empirically, judges are more
likely to exploit ambiguities to resist congressional oversight after overrides of
decisions involving individual rights and contested issues such as civil rights.
Given the politically salient nature of antidiscrimination legislation, it is likely
that some judges would claim that the Fair Pay Act enhances Ledbetter's
authority.
II. THE FAIR PAY ACT'S EFFECT ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
In addition to its effects on individual Title VII plaintiffs, a narrow override
also may endorse interpretive shifts in doctrine in a direction that contravenes
Congress's policy intent. Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has
2o. Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982).
21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 74-76
(1988).
22. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 17o n.5 (2001)
("Absent... overwhelming evidence of acquiescence, we are loath to replace the plain text
and original understanding of a statute with an amended agency interpretation.").
23. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 71; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 157-58 (2000) (stating that Congress ratified the FDA's interpretation that it lacked the
authority to regulate tobacco products because it enacted statutes indicating its awareness of
and acquiescence to the FDA interpretation).
24. For example, Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to override a
number of Supreme Court decisions, but did not override Meritor Savings Bank FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the Court
interpreted this omission as ratifying the Meritor decision. Id. at 804 n.4.
25. JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY
COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 171 (2004) (hypothesizing that judges are disinclined to defer
to Congress on these issues because judges are accustomed to scrutinizing legislation
affecting suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause).
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progressively narrowed its interpretation of Title VII's EEOC charge provision
to impose more formidable procedural hurdles on plaintiffs filing employment
discrimination suits.2
6
The legislative history of the Fair Pay Act indicates that Congress opposes
Ledbetter's reasoning in general, not solely in the context of wage
discrimination. Representative George Miller, the sponsor of the bill, noted:
Discrimination does not just occur when the initial decision to
discriminate is made. You may not know when the decision to
discriminate against you was made. You may not recognize it when it is
made. Discrimination occurs both when an employer decides to
discriminate and then when the employer actually discriminates -by,
for example, paying you less because you are a woman, or African
American, or older than the other employees.27
Many similar statements made in support of the Fair Pay Act during the floor
debates demonstrate that representatives supported the Act because they
believed that employers should not be able to avoid liability for a
discriminatory policy merely because employees are not aware of the policy
until six months after it is adopted. 8
26. Over time, the Court has limited which discriminatory practices constitute "continuing
violations" (practices that are cumulative and may occur over a long period of time) and
instead has characterized most challenged practices as discrete discriminatory acts. For
example, in its initial rulings on the provision, the Court held that where an employee was
impermissibly terminated due to her race or gender, the charge period ran from the date of
termination (regardless of any subsequent employment relationship). Del. State Coll. v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (holding that the EEOC charge period ran from the date tenure
was denied, not the date of final termination, where a librarian was denied tenure allegedly
due to his national origin but was given a nonrenewable one-year contract); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (barring a flight attendant, who was terminated
discriminatorily and later rehired but treated as a new employee for seniority purposes, from
suing because she failed to file within ninety days of the initial termination). The Court later
held in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), that facially neutral
seniority systems allegedly adopted with discriminatory intent were actionable only on their
date of adoption, not upon their application to individual employees. In National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. lO (2002), the Supreme Court further restricted the
scope of continuing violations, stating in dicta that the category only clearly applied to
hostile work environment claims. Id. at 115.
27. Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court's Ledbetter v. Goodyear Employment
Discrimination Decision: Hearing on H.R. 2831 Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor,
inoth Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Rep. George Miller, Chairman, H. Comm. on Education
and Labor).
28. E.g., 153 CONG. REc. H89 4 6 (daily ed. July 30, 2007) (statement of Rep. Nadler)
("[A]nyone who says that discrimination in employment should be illegal but should not be
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The House committee report provides the clearest statement that Congress
opposes the Court's reasoning in Ledbetter in contexts beyond wage
discrimination. The report states that the Fair Pay Act is intended to serve as
yet another disapproval of the approach used by the Court in both
Lorance, which has already been reversed by Congress, and Ledbetter,
which is reversed with this bill. The Committee cannot envision every
fact pattern in which charges might be brought within 18o/3oo days of
an act that effectuates a past decision to discriminate. Application of the
seniority system in Lorance was one; paycheck issuance in Ledbetter
was another. By rejecting the Court's holdings in these cases, the
Congress rejects the Court's underlying idea that the statute of
limitations starts to run upon the mere decision to discriminate and not
also upon the employer's effectuation of that discriminatory decision.2 9
Congress's intent that the reasoning of the Fair Pay Act apply to discrimination
in contexts beyond compensation decisions will likely be disregarded, however,
because it is not written into the text of the statute.3" In the past, the doctrinal
development of the interpretation of the EEOC charge provision has not been
consistent with the manifest intent of Congress. Context-specific legislative
overrides have contributed to this increasingly narrow interpretation of the
EEOC charge provision. Congress's override of Lorance in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 carved out an exception only for discriminatory seniority systems,
permitting employees to file a charge with the EEOC at the time of adoption
and application of intentionally discriminatory seniority systems.31 It is clear
from legislative history, however, that Congress intended to broaden the scope
of the EEOC charge provision as applied to all discriminatory policies, not just
enforceable if the employer can hide the discrimination for 6 months is really saying let the
discrimination go on forever."); id. at H8949 (statement of Rep. Wasserman Schultz) ("In
the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become evident. However, Justice
Alito ruled that victims have only 18o days after a discriminatory decision has been made to
file suit even if that employee would have no way of knowing about it. This standard is
impossible to meet.").
29. H.R. REP. No. 110-237, at 17 (2007).
30. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994) ("[G]iven ample evidence that
Congress today is more than willing to override Supreme Court decisions by enacting new
or modified statutory language, one might question how much weight, if any, should be
given to an expression of disapproval from Congress other than an override contained in
precise statutory text." (citation omitted)).
31. Civil Rights Act of 199i, Pub. L. No. 1O2-166, 1O5 Star. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-
5(e)(2) (2000)).
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seniority systems. The Senate report on the override for the Civil Rights Act of
199o-a nearly identical precursor to the Civil Rights Act of 1991-stated:
"Where, as was alleged in Lorance, an employer adopts a rule or decision with
an unlawful discriminatory motive, each application of that rule or decision is a
new violation of the law. '32 Further, the sponsors of the amendment stated in
an interpretive memorandum that "[t]his legislation should be interpreted as
disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to contexts outside of seniority
systems."33 Despite these statements of broad legislative purpose, Congress's
failure to write this intent into the text of the statute allowed the Court to
interpret the partial override of Lorance as acquiescing in the Court's narrowing
of Title VII doctrine.
The Ledbetter Court relied on Lorance as a justification for further
narrowing the interpretation of the EEOC charge provision. The Court
explicitly noted that Congress only reversed the Lorance opinion with regard to
discriminatory seniority systems:
After Lorance, Congress amended Title VII to cover the specific
situation involved in that case .... For present purposes, what is most
important about the amendment in question is that it applied only to
the adoption of a discriminatory seniority system, not to other types of
employment discrimination. 34
The Court, ignoring clear legislative history to the contrary, supported its
doctrinal narrowing in Ledbetter by relying in part on Congress's fact-specific
override of Lorance to argue that Congress did not expand access to plaintiffs
outside of the seniority system context. Despite the intent of the enacting
Congress, the Fair Pay Act may have consequences similar to the 1991 Act,
preserving and perhaps even enhancing Ledbetter's future authority as a
precedent for constricting access to Title VII's protections. Future courts may
look to the Fair Pay Act as evidence that Congress acquiesced in the Court's
holding that the effects of discriminatory policies do not constitute actionable,
unlawful employment practices in all contexts other than wage discrimination,
and they may continue to narrow the doctrine and further limit access to Title
32. S. REP. No. 101-315, at 54 (199o). No relevant language changed between the two versions of
the bill, and there was no Senate report submitted with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 549. For these
reasons, the 199o Senate report has been considered an authoritative indication of legislative
intent for the 1991 Act. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2183
n.5 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
33. 137 CONG. REc. 29,046, 29,047 (1991).
34. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 n.2 (citations omitted).
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VII relief. Moreover, the failure of the Lorance override also makes clear that
legislative history indicating that Congress intended the amendment to have
broader application is insufficient and will not serve other Title VII plaintiffs or
shape the direction of future doctrinal development. Mere inclusion of a
broader purpose in the legislative history likely will be insufficient to induce
courts to read the Fair Pay Act as applying to discriminatory policies other than
those that affect compensation. If Congress intends for the statute to apply to
other contexts and hopes to avoid a future decision employing the Ledbetter
standard to further limit opportunities for victims of discrimination to gain
relief under Title VII, it must anticipate the way that future courts will
interpret the statute and write a broader override into the text of the statute.
CONCLUSION
This case study of the Fair Pay Act suggests that when overriding a judicial
interpretation of federal statutes, Congress should not narrowly focus on the
factual elements of the judicial interpretation, but instead broadly consider the
way in which, according to established methods of statutory interpretation,
future courts will interpret its actions.
Since the late 197os, Congress repeatedly has overridden conservative
judicial interpretations of federal civil rights statutes,3s and legislative history
has suggested that Congress is not content with the development of Title VII
doctrine. Congress has incentives to "pass vague overrides that allow credit-
claiming but pass the buck to the courts",, 6 because civil rights legislation
provides diffuse benefits to marginalized groups and imposes concentrated
costs on private employers. However, the way that Congress has overridden
judicial holdings that did not comport with congressional intent has not
stemmed the increasingly cramped Title VII doctrine and has allowed courts to
continue developing Title VII doctrine in a conservative direction. If Congress
is serious about stopping the Court from turning back the clock on access to
Title VII remedies, it should eschew piecemeal, fact-specific amendments and
consider an unambiguous future-oriented approach that anticipates the judicial
application of the legislation across a range of factual settings.
KATHRYN A. EIDMANN
35. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, loi
YALE L.J. 331, 375 (1991).
36. BARNES, supra note 25, at 179.
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